SEKAB greenwashed the EIA
What do you do first when you get a thick technical EIA report in your hand? I flick through the summary to the conclusions chapter where I expect to find something like a verdict. In the case of SEKAB’s draft EIA report I am met by this all-important little paragraph that could well be the only part of the report that a busy and not so technically conversant policy maker or journalist reads:
“Although there are some limited negative environmental implications of the project, the project will have significant socio-economic and environmental benefits to the people of communities surrounding the project, Bagamoyo District and the Nation. The associated negative impacts, to a large extent have been minimized through good project design and envisaged farm operation practices. ”
This is from the incomplete draft version of the EIA report that Bryceson et al criticizes. The draft, dated July 2008, is available for download at the website of Swedish Radio programme Klotet. Development Today revealed last week that the conclusions quoted above were written by SEKAB. The company changed the consultants’ report while leaving their name and signatures on it.
But this is not the version that Orgut did not sign for. Orgut team leader Melinda Fones-Sundell says to Development Today that Orgut accepted the changes in July:
Fones-Sundell justifies this, saying that the detailed baseline studies contained Orgut’s main observations, which would be available for NEMC to see.
So the fact that the general conclusions is a greenwash by SEKAB was not a problem for Orgut, since the NEMC experts will draw their own conclusions anyhow.
Then what is the purpose of including conclusions at all? The phrase “some limited negative environmental implications” is pure nonsense (what would unlimited implications be like?) and serves only to deceive readers who are looking for what all the data in the report means.
But then again we don’t even get to see the full report since SEKAB has not released it. It has only been submitted to NEMC, the government authority responsible for approving it. According to a comment by Geir Sundet to my previous post NEMC has a backlog of EIAs that could take years to clear, which could mean that the report can be kept away from the public during the period when all the important decisions are made by investors and government authorities. Should someone ask for it SEKAB can say that it is stuck in government bureaucracy but that it showed “some limited” negative effects and “significant benefits” to communities, district and nation.
In actual fact the study shows serious risks, most importanly that there isn’t enough water in the Wami River.
It is the final version of the report, the one that was submitted to NEMC, that Orgut now disowns since SEKAB continued to tinker with it between July and December without seeking the consultant’s approval.
Earlier this month, in connection with questions raised by Development Today, Orgut was surprised to receive this final EIA report from SEKAB, dated December 2008. The report bears Orgut’s name with Melinda Fones- Sundell’s signature. Yet she tells DT she had never seen this report before. In a mail in late March, Renman informed Orgut that its report contained “many incorrect statements” and had an unacceptable standard. DT asked Renman what SEKAB’s main points of criticism are, but he declined to elaborate.
Orgut’s report was submitted to SEKAB in May 2008. Why did SEKAB wait until March 2009 to inform Orgut that the report was of “unacceptable standard”?
SEKAB and their cheerleaders seem to suggest that although large scale industrial biofuel production is risky in this environment, this is a company that is so honest, transparent, open and committed to “humble learning” (Arvidsson in The Guardian) that they deserve to be given land areas the size of small countries for 99 years. For free.
But SEKAB is anything but transparent and open. They tinkered with the EIA and keep it away from both the public and the consultants who made the studies. They don’t tell exactly which areas they are after in Rufiji. The criteria used in their certification system turned out to be secret when Swedwatch asked to see them. They met with Sida but won’t say what they talked about. In Sweden they didn’t submit their tax returns last year and took a penalty to conceal their losses while negotiating with secret potential buyers.
SEKAB can do the talk but not the walk. Behind the rhetoric about sustainability they behave much like the other land grabbing business ventures in Africa.
Another lesson from this strange story is: Don’t read the conclusions in the summary of EIAs. Draw your own.
